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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Under applicable law determining river-designated boundary lines between counties, did defendant prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the subject property was located north of the
Weber River (i.e., in Weber County) on January 10, 1866.
2. In any event, is defendant precluded by estoppel from
denying the Davis County source of its claimed title to the subject
property.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
Plaintiffs Baxter appeal from a Judgment

entered in this

matter purporting to quiet title to a six-acre tract of land in
defendant Utah Department of Transportation. In their Complaint,
plaintiffs set forth a Davis County Tax Deed as the basis for
seeking to have title quieted in their names; defendant responded
with an Answer containing an Affirmative Defense which asserted
that the subject property was located in Weber County and that
Davis County had no authority to levy taxes thereon.
The dispute in this litigation involves a determination of
whether the subject six-acre tract of land was located in Davis
County or in Weber County when their common boundary line was
established on January 10, 1866.
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Court,
A non-jury trial was held before Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge,
on August 26-27, 1986. Judgment was entered on October 6, 1986.
Notice of Appeal was filed and entered on November 4, 1986.
Plaintiffs by this appeal seek to have the Judgment reversed and to
have title to the subject property quieted in themselves.
C. Statement of Facts.
On May 26, 1969, plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter, together with
Ronald Toone and Thomas Hollberg, purchased an 18-acre tract of
land at tax sale from Davis County, each acquiring an undivided
one-third interest as tenants-in-common. Theland was described as-Sk of N^ of the SW% of Sec. 25, 5N, 1W, SLM,
cont. 18.00 Acres in Davis County,
Serial No. S.W. 3

(Exh. P-2)

In 1970, they divided the 18 acres by quit claim deeds, resulting in plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as

fl

BaxtersM) acquiring

the six-acre tract which is the subject of this litigation (Exhs.
P-3, P-4 and P-5; R. 411 -413).
The chain of title to the 18-acre tract reveals that Tasma P.
Dansie filed a quiet title action in the Second District Court of
Weber County , and in 1946 she secured a Decree quieting title to
various lands, separately described as being in either Weber or
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Davis County. The l8-acre tract was specifically described in the
Decree as being in Davis County(R.405-406). On March 10, 1961,
Tasma P. Dansie conveyed the 18-acre tract to Robert Rees Dansie and
his wife, but the document was not recorded until April 13, 1964
(R. 409).
On May 14, 1964, Robert Rees

Dansie and his wife conveyed the

subject property (and other lands) to State Road Commission of
Utah, predecessor to defendant Utah Department of Transportation
(hereinafter referred to as

ff

UD0TM), which prepared the Warranty

Deed. However, that document departed from prior conveyances in the
chain of title and recited for the first time that the subject property
was located in Weber County (Exh.D-23). When the Davis County Recorder
refused to record the deed so as to show the subject property being
in Davis County, counsel for UDOT erased "Weber County" and substituted
"Davis County" on the document, and it was recorded on March 31, 1975
(Exh. P-12).
All of the referenced title documents were duly recorded in the
Recorder's office in Davis County.
Because record title to the subject property was in the name of
Tasma P. Dansie on January 1, 1964, the failure of anyone to pay 1964
real property taxes resulted in the 1969 Davis County tax sale.
During the early spring of 1978, respondent and/or its contractor entered upon the subject property for the purpose of removing gravel-type materials, whereupon appellants filed a Notice of
-3-

Claim pursuant to Section 63-30-6, Utah Code Annotated (as Amended
1^65), seeking to quiet title to the subject property. No action was
taken on the claim, and the Complaint in this matter was filed in
the Second District Court in and for Davis County in 1979 (R.l-5).
Baxters pleaded the Davis County Tax Deed in their Complaint as
the basis for quiet title relief. UDOT then filed its Answer containing a general denial and, in addition and by way of defense,
affirmatively alleged that the subject property was located in Weber
County (R. 62-66).
UDOT in furtherance of its affirmative defense, filed a motion
ir^ the Second District Court of Davis County to have the matter removed tu the Second District Court of Weber County. Judge Douglas
Cornaby transferred the case since the subject property at the time
of his Order (R. 33-35) was located on the north side of the Weber
River, ostensibly providing a jurisdictional basis for Weber County
court proceedings on the issue of the boundary line between the two
c^untieb.
Respondent then moved for Summary Judgment before Judge Calvin
Gould in the Second District Court of Weber County, contending that
(among other things) appellants were collaterally estopped from
bringing this action because plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter appeared as
an expert witness in a gravel-removal case between Ronald L. Toone
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and Johnson Construction Company involving an adjoining property.
Judge Gould ruled in favor of UDOT, and Summary Judgment was entered
on March 3, 1983-- together with a subsequent Final Order entered on
or before April 9, 1983, purporting to quiet title to the subject
property in UDOT.

Plaintiffs appealed the Summary Judgment and

Final Order to this Court.
On August 26, 1985, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
reversed (Case No. 19097, cited as 705 P. 2d 1167),

and the case

was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
A Pretrial hearing was held before Judge David Roth on August
4, 1986 (Exh. P-20 , which is a complete transcript of the Pretrial
hearing on that date) subsequent to his Ruling denying UDOT's Motion
for Summary Judgment based upon an 1894 survey of the then-location
of the Weber River-- which UDOT asserted to be the boundary line between the two counties-- and he held that the boundary between Weber
and Davis counties was established by the legislature of the Territory
of Utah as the main channel of the Weber River in the area of the subjuect property as it existed when the two counties were created in
1866 (R.456-458, and Exh.

P-20 at pp. 38-43).

Judge Roth adopted his written Ruling on Motion for Summary
Judgment dated May 21, 1896, as supplemented at his direction with
portions of the Pretrial transcript (Exh. P-20 at p.40; and Addenda
I and II) as the Pretrial Order, holding that the issues set for trial
were to be decided by determining whether the subject property, as of
-5-

1866, was locu^ed on the south (i.e., Davis County) side or the
north (i.e., Weber County) side of the main channel of the Weber
River.
In addition, and as a further supplement to the Pretrial proceedings, Judge Roth ruled in a Memorandum Decision that UDOT, by
reason of its Affirmative Defense to the Complaint, had the burden of
proving that the subject property was located in Weber County in 1866.
The matter went to trial on August 26, 1986, before Ronald 0.
Hyde, District Judge, sitting without a jury. The uncontradicted
evidence established that, as of January 10, 1866, when the boundary
line between the two counties was established, the subject property
wac located on the south (i.ec, Davis County) side of the Weber
River and that not a trickle of the Weber River waters flowed on the
south side of the subject property. However, taking a position contrary
to Judge Roth's Pretrial rulings, Judge Hyde found that the "exact"
location of the Weber River in the general area of the subject property could not be determined, that the present county surveyors and
engineers were unable to furnish a "description" of the riverfs
location in 1866-- there being no survey of the river location prior
to 1894-- and that the boundary line between the two counties should
therefore be established in the location where the Weber River was
flowing in 1894 (and where it is flowing today) in accordance with
the 1894 survey (R. 485, and Addendum III).
Further, and again proceeding contrary to Judge Rothfs Mem-

orandum Decision supplementing his Pretrial rulings, Judge Hyde held
that plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the subject property was located in Davis County as of 1866
(R. 485; and see Addenda III and IV).
Official U.S. Surveyor General surveys which were run in
the years 1855, 1871 and 1886 placed the main channel of the Weber
River as it flowed from east to west to where it crossed the west
(i.e.,north-south) line of Section 25 at a point a few hundred feet
northwest of the subject property to be 34.5 chains(2,277 feet) north
of the southwest corner of Section 25 (Exhs. P-1,P-15, P-16 and P-17;
and Exhs« D-14, D-15, and D-16). Subsequent to 1886, and prior to
1894, a sudden change in the river resulted in the channel being located
on the south side of the subject property, crossing the west line of
Section 25 at a point only 715 feet north of the southwest corner of
25-- an avulsive shift of 1,562 feet (Exh. P-l; and Exhs. D-2, D-4,
D-5, D-12, D-17, D-18, D-19, D-20 and D-21).
Judge Hyde thereupon ruled consistent with UDOTfs contentions
that there was no prior survey which described the location of the
Weber River east of the section line by metes-and-bounds and adopted
the metes-and-bounds description made by the surveyors of the respective counties in 1894 as being the 1866 boundary line between the
two counties. Judgment was entered for respondent UDOT upon the basis
that the subject property was and is located in Weber County (R*521,
and Addenda IV and V — Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment).
-7-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The lower courtfs findings relative to the location of the
Weber River in 1866 are clearly erroneous and contrary to the evidence, and they are insufficient and inadequate in that they fail
to address the primary issue in this case as framed at Pretrial-and which coirports to law-- to-wit: Where was the location of the
Weber River in 1866 in relation to the subject property; that since
the evidence conclusively established that the subject property was
located south of the Weber River in 1866-- and absent a necessary
contrary finding-- the Judgment must fail for lack of both factual
and legal support.
Furthermore, since UDOT asserted that the subject property was
located in Weber County by way of Affirmative Defense to the Complaint,
Judge Roth made an additional Pretrial ruling that the burden of
proving that the subject property was located in Weber County in 1866
was upon defendant UDOT; that UDOT failed to meet its burden, and made
no attempt to do so, and even if the findings of the lower court be
taken at face value, they contradict and destroy the type of proof
necessary to support UDOTfs burden in this case.
That UDOTfs attempt to establish the location of the Weber River
( and the common boundary line between the two counties) at its
location south of the subject property, where it was flowing in 1894,
must fail. Although contended by UDOT, and adopted by the trial court,
that an 1894 courses-and-distances survey of the meandering
-8-

Weber River in the area of the subject property was made pursuant
to a statute providing for a resolution of boundary-line disputes
between counties, the survey failed to do so because (a) it was a
first-time survey made by the county surveyors at the instigation
of Davis County for the purpose of preparing a county-wide map which
would show major physical features, (b) the surveyors did not erect
monuments along the river in the area of the subject property, (c)
the surveyors made no attempt to take into account the sudden and
substantial

(avulsive) channel change due to natural or man-made

events which occurred between 1886-1894 and caused it to abandon
its old channel, (d) neither county subsequently ratified or
accepted the survey as establishing the common boundary, (e) there
was and is no evidence that the 1894 survey was made for the purpose
of resolving a disputed or uncertain boundary line (as mandated by
the statute), and (f), in any event, the survey did not attempt to
locate the location of the Weber River boundary

ff

as0o. now establish

ed by lawn ( i.e., as of 1666).
Finally, as bearing on the county-situs of the subject property
and as establishing a separate and independent basis for reversal,
recitals in the chain of title to the subject property all placed
the land in Davis County, until the chain was first broken by
Dansiefs deed to UDOT in 1964 wherein the situs was recited as being
in Weber County-- the event which gave rise to this litigation;
therefore, by reason of the doctrine of estoppel by deed, which
-9-

prohibits contesting claimants from denying material recitals in
conveyances from a common-source grantor, UDOT is estopped from
denying that the subject property is in Davis County.
ARGUMENT
I.
TIIE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT, AS OF JANUARY 10,
1866 AND UNTIL AT LEAST 1886, THE ENTIRE FLOW OF THE WEBER RIVER WAS
NCKTIi OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, THEREBY PLACING IT IN DAVIS COUNTY.
The boundary line between Weber and Davis Counties was
established by the location of the Weber River as of January 10,
1866, as set forth in Compiled Laws of Utah of 1876, Sections 156
and 157, and thereafter adopted by Article XI,Section 1 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah:
"( 156) Sec. 14.
... a line running east from a point (on the eastern
shore of the Great Salt Lake) to a point in the centre
of the channel of the Weber River due north from the
northwest corner of Kingston's Fort, thence up the
centre of said channel to a point opposite the summit
of the Wasatch Mountains ,. . . "
Critical to an analysis of the location of the Weber River
in 1866 is the fact that this is not a lawsuit between Davis and
Weber Counties seeking to establish the location of the Weber
River for some extended distance for general county purposes* Rather,
this litigation involves a dispute between what in effect constitutes two private litigants, each claiming title to a six-acre tract
of land. The foregoing distinction brings to the fore two entirely
-10-

different approaches to the problem made by Judge Roth, who
conducted the Pre-trial, and Judge Hyde, who .tried the case.
The central theme adopted by Judge Hyde in his Memorandum
Decision and his Findings of Fact was that "an exact location of
river in 1866 cannot be placed,11 and that there was Man uncertainty
as to the location of the river" inasmuch as official U. S. Surveys
of the river location along the west line of Section 25 "did not
describe the location of the river east of the section line," and
that, therefore and because no prior surveys of the river had ever
been made, an 1894 survey of the then-existing channel of the Weber
River made by the surveyors of the two counties established the
boundary line between the two counties.
On the other hand, Judge Roth ruled at Pretrial (Exh. P-20 at
pp. 38 and 43)

and in his Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment

(R. 456), adopted by him as a portion of his Pretrial Order ( Exh.
P-20, p. 40), that the issue involved a determination of whether
the Weber River in 1866 was located north or south of the subject
property.
Baxters prepared their case and presented evidence at trial
in accordance with Judge Rothfs Pretrial

rulings, proving that the

Weber River was located north of the subject property in 1866. UDOT
disregarded the three-part Pretrial Order and presented evidence at
trial along lines adopted by Judge Hyde in his Memorandum Decision
and Findings of Fact. It should be noted that Judge Hyde avoided any

reference to the 1866 river location in relation to the subject property
The U.S. Surveyor General conducted official surveys of the
west (i.e., north-south)line of Section 25 in 1855, 1871 and 1886
(Exhs. P-15, P-16 and P-17). The field notes of the surveys carefully delineated every physical feature along the survey route, including each watercourse encountered. The 1855 survey showed a small
river channel only .40 chains (26 feet) wide at a point 22.60 chains
north of the SW corner of Section 25. At 32.70 chains the river was
encountered again, after crossing an "island," and the river was crossed
at 34.50 chains--!.80 chains (118 ft.) wide

(Exh. P-16).

The 1871 and 1886 surveys also encountered the small channel,
but the field notes designated it as an "old river bed." Significantly, the largest river channel was again found at 34o50 chains
(1871) and 34.75 chains (1886)--Exh. P-l, reproduced on opposite
page.
(See Addendum VI for excerpts from U.S. Survey field notes)
In addition to the field notes, the U. S. Surveys were accompanied by maps prepared by the surveyors which showed the location
of prominent physical features in the area. For instance, in 1855-just eight years after Utah was first settled-- the location of
the river channel as it coursed from east to west across Section 25
was plotted, as well as adjacent mountains. And in 1871-- just two
years after the transcontinental railroad
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W Omits

kJ>ir>

Canyon-- the surveyors plotted the location of the river in relation to the U.P.R.R., minor streams, the east-west quarter
section line, adjacent mountains and existing roads (See Exhs.
D-14 and D-15, reproduced at pp. 14 and 15, and Exh. D-16, reproduced in Addendum VII)
Although Judge Hyde felt the location of the Weber River to
the east of the west line of Section 25 was not described, it is
submitted that, for the purpose of locating a boundary line between
two counties which is designated as a river-- subject to ordinary
minor sidewise movements (i.e>, relictions and accretions)-- the
surveys and maps were the very best evidence available under the
circumstances. It should be noted that the survey maps were certified by the Surveyor General of Utah as being "strictly conformable to the field notes11 of the surveys.
The Weber River flowed across the SW% prior to 1894 against
and below the hillside, and substantially parallel to the U.P.R.R.
tracks. In addition to the U.S.Surveys, a private map prepared in
1890 (Exh. P-6) by the "Wyoming and Western Railway11 and filed in
the book of Private Surveys of Davis County, shows the Weber River
in the same location where placed by the U.S. Surveys, as well as
the location of Kingstons Fort.
The pre-1894 river channel across the SW% of Section 25 has
always been marked by a distinct row of large trees, as marked on
-16-

the 1871 U.S. Survey Map and on all of the aerial photos: Exh.
D-17 (1937), Exh. D-19 (1946), Exh. D-18(1952),E*hs. D-20 and P-l
(1958) and Exh. D-21(1965). The line of trees shown on the U. S.
Surveys and on all aerial photos coincide with the Weber River
location in 1855, 1871 and 1886. The line of trees exists today,
showing the old-channel location in clear detail.
If the exact location of the Weber River in the general area
had been contemplated by the territorial legislature, it easily
could have adopted a line which could have been, or which then
was, determined by reference to the U.S. Survey that had been completed in the area. See San Juan County v. Grand County

(1962),

13 Utah 2d 242.
UDOT contended that there was no "main channel11 of the Weber
River prior to 1894 (Exh. P-20 at p.23), but the facts and law are
otherwise. All three U.S. Surveys found a small river channel at
approximately 25.0 chains north of the SW corner of Section 25-only 26 feet wide and dry in 1871 and 1886. On the other hand, all
three surveys encountered the main channel of the Weber River
at 34.5 to 34.75 chains north of the Section corner-- a river
1.25 to 1.50 chains

(82 ft. to 100 ft.) wide and flowing between

2\ and 3 feet deep.
Main Channel
That bed of the river over which the principal volume
of water flows. Many great rivers discharge themselves
into the sea through more than one channel. They all,
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however, have a main channel. Packet Co. v. Bridge
Co. ( C.C.) 31 F.757. Compare State of Oklahoma v.
State of Texas, 258 U.S.574, 42 S. Ct. 406, 414,
66 L. Ed. 771.
Black1s law Dictionary, Third Edition,
pp. 308-309
It is difficult to define the 'main channel1 of a river
with precision, but it is sufficient to say that it is
that bed of a river over which the principal volume of
water flows...
Words and Phrases, Vol.26, p.62

Of even greater significance, however, the location of the
subject property, as superimposed in red on Exhs. D-14, D-15 and
D-16, is located south of the entire Weber River system as it existed in 1866, thereby making any issue as to what channel may
have been the main channel a moot issue and clearly establishing
the location of the subject property as being in Davis County in
1866.
The oldest Davis County Assessors Plat Map of Section 25
shows the old river location in substantially the same location as
set forth in the three U. S. Surveys and maps. The subject property
(marked with a red arrow) was then owned by Tasma Dansie, and it
was located south of the Weber River— in Davis County.
reproduced on opposite page.
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(See Exh.P-7

SW£ of Section 2£

EXHIBIT P — ?
Taken from "Assessors Plat Maps" book of Tp* U~3> N, R. 1 W.
Davis County Recorder's Office
• The location of the Y-eber River is shown as it existed prior to
the channel change *vhich occurred between 1886 and 189U#
Arrovf indicates location of subject property—superimposed
on the E>chibit#
#

Coloration appears on original Bchibit.
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The surveyors and engineers who testified at trial all
agreed on examination by plaintiffs1 counsel that no portion of
the WeberRiver waters were flowing on the south side of the subject
property in 1866:
UDOTfs witness Max B. Elliott, Davis County Surveyor -C. But in any event, you found the river up near that area
in all three years, didn't you?
A. Found it further north than it is on that map, that's
correct.
Q. My other question, in any of the surveys conducted by the
United States Surveyor General, in either 1855, 1871 or
1866, didyou find in any of those surveys, any water of
the Weber River located south of the Baxter tract shown
on Exhibit PI?
A. Not on those notes.
Q. Not a drop of water to the south, did you?
A. No.
Q. All of the Weber River water shown was somewhere to the
north of the Baxter tract, wasn't it?
A. On those notes, that's correct.
Q. On those notes. And until 1894, you found no indication
of water south of the tract until that '94 survey came
about, did you?
A. I found nothing on that prior to the 1894 survey, that's
correct.
(Tr. 2 7 - 2 8 — R. 580-581)
UDOT's witness John P. Reeve, Weber County Surveyor-C. But you didn't find any water as of 1855 or 1871 flowing
on the south of this property, did you?
A

-

No

-

(Tr. 76 --R. 629)
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UDOT's witness Jack L. DeMass, an engineer and surveyor-Q. All right. As to Exhibit 9, which is this chart that has
been prepared-- I think you've stated this was your work?
A. Yes.
Q. And if I read the chart correctly and relate it to
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, the chart does not indicate in any
respect that the Weber River water or any portion of it
was flowing south of the subject property at least through
1886?
A. If I can clarify that. None was flowing there during the
two weeks in October when they made the survey.
C. Yes.
A. Not to say that it wasn't there during the year. I did not
agree with that.
Q. All right. Did you find anything in the Surveyor General's
notes to indicate that there were old channels south of the
channel located some 22 chains north of the section corner
of this southwest corner?
A. No.
Q. No channels were indicated, were they?
A. No.
(Tr. 93-94" R . 646-647)
Plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter, an engineer and surveyor-0. fbw some general questions. On the three surveys that you
ran or that the government ran, excuse me, and that you
plotted, didyou find any river indication that was common
to all three surveys?
A. Yes. The area at approximately 34 and a half chains showed
the main channel of the Weber River on all three surveys
with slight variance.
(Tr. 156-157-R-709-710)
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Q. Now, as you have reviewed the survey notes for all three
years, was there any indication up through 1886, that
there was any portion of the Weber River at a point roughly
715 feet north of the southwest quarter of section 25?
A. No, there was no river in that location at that time.
C. None at all?
A. None.
0. Do the notes in any respect reveal from a point south
of 22.6 chains north of the section corner, any old
river channel between there and the southwest quarter
of the section?
A. None.

(Tr. 158 -- R# 711)

THE WITNESS: Yes. From all I can determine from the notes,
the main channel of the Weber River was approximately
600 feet north of the subject property.
C. ( BY MR. FULLER) And that's on a due north/south bearing?
A. Yes.

(Tr.166-- R. 719)

Although there was no legal description showing the exact
location of the Weber River where it flowed in 1866, and while
the surveyors disagreed as to which of three river channels constituted the main channel of the river in 1866, on the critical
issue in the case there was no disagreement: All three river
channels were flowing on the north side of the subject property
in 1866.
There is no evidence in this case which even suggests that
any portion of the waters of the Weber River flowed anywhere but
on the north side of the subject property in 1866.
.oo.

Two Utah cases have addressed the issue of disputed county
lines where not tied to the U. S. survey system. In the case of
Barton v. Sanpete County

(1916), 49 U. 188, 162 P. 611, the terri-

torial legislature tied the division line between Juab and Sanpete
Counties in the area of Barton's lands to "a point east of the place
where the Gunnison road crosses the divide between Chicken creek
and Sevier river; then in a straight line southwesterly to the upper
bluff rocks at the south end of Cedar Ridge.ff
As anyone knowledgeable about legal descriptions would recognize, and as was noted in the decision, the description was fatally
flawed since there was no way of fixing the location of the

!,

point,!

which was east of where the Gunnison road crossed the divide.
The State Engineer tried to establish the boundary-line where
he "thought11 it should be according to the procedure for resolving
disputes provided by state statute, but the matter eventually was
placed before the Utah legislature, which amended the boundary-line
description. When the matter finally reached the Utah Supreme Court,
it was held that the original boundary line was

"a floating, or, to

be more exact, an unidentified11 boundary, and that the legislature
acted properly in the circumstances:
...The legal effect of what was done by the Legislature
was merely to determine and fix the originally contemplated
territorial limits of the two counties. No territory was
therefore annexed to one or stricken from the other county,
and hence the constitutional provision has no application
here.
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The Barton case was critically analyzed and its ruling strictly
limited to the facts of that case in Summit County v. Rich County
( 1921), 57 U. 553, 195 P.639. In the Summit County case the countyboundary description where it followed the Union Pacific Railroad
was claimed to be indefinite, and the matter thereupon was placed
before the Utah legislature, which proceeded to establish a boundary
line.
In holding the legislative action unconstitutional, the Utah
Supreme Court made the following observations and rulings:
... If it had appeared in the Barton Case, upon a comparison
of the original boundary line, with the boundary line established by the Legislature in 1913, that the Legislature had
manifestly ignored a plain indubitable line marked by a
transcontinental railroad for a distance of approximately
four miles, thereby shifting the railroad from one county to
another, together with thousands of acres of lands and their
inhabitants, the writer is of the opinion that the court would
have held that the act was unconstitutional and void....
P. 643
andj

We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact that the
Legislature which originally defined the boundary line
between Summit and Rich counties, according to the complaint,
manifestly intended that the north side of the Union Pacific
Railroad should constitute the boundary line between the
two counties for a distance as above stated of approximately
four miles...
P. 644
Further, and with respect to establishing exact

descriptions

of all boundaries such as could be ascertained by engineering skill,
the Court observed:
-24-

It is not our province on this appeal to determine, or
attempt to determine, the exact location of the true
boundary line at all points between the two counties.
P. 643
and,
The fact that other parts of the boundary line between
the two counties may be ambiguous or unascertainable by
engineering skill did not justify the Legislature in
ignoring altogether that which was clear and unmistakable. It was the duty of the Legislature in attempting to
establish the boundary line to follow the statutory description as nearly as practicable, and, if it found it
impracticable to follow it at some particular point, then
to establish a new line. In doing so, however, it was still
its duty to be guided by what it conceived to be the
intention of the Legislature which attempted to'establish
the original line.
( Underlining added)
P. 644
The North Dakota case of Tavis v. Higgins • (1968), 157 N.W.2d
718 is similar in many respects to the subject litigation. That
action, involving two individuals seeking to quiet title to a tract
of land which was affected by avulsive

(sudden) changes over the

years in the channel of the Missouri River, raised the primary
issue of

the location of the subject land in relation to the

Missouri River when the two counties were created by the territorial
legislature in 1873. Disregarding any necessity for exact descriptions, and making its ruling binding only

"as between the plaintiff

and defendant,11 that court made the following observations and rulings:
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It is undisputed that Lot 5 and the South Half of the
Southeast Quarter ( S%SE%) of Section 18-138-80 was east
of the main channel of the river, and thus in Burleigh
County, at the time of the original Government survey in
1872.
P. 724
Where the boundary between two counties is fixed by law
as the middle of the stream or channel of a river, such
law must be construed as referring to the channel as it
existed at the time of passage of the law. An artificial
or sudden change by avulsion, or otherwise, in the course
of such stream which defines the boundary between two
counties, causing a new channel to be formed, does not
change the boundary. But where such change is gradual and
imperceptible, the rule is otherwise. 20 C.J.S. Counties
Sec. 15, p.765 at p.766.
Therefore, having concluded that the defendants have failed
to establish that the land claimed by the plaintiffs was
gradually and imperceptibly accreted to Morton County, we
construe the boundary between Morton and Burleigh counties
as fixed by law when such boundary was first established by
Chapter 18 of the Session Laws of 1872, Dakota Territory.
P. 726
... a sudden and avulsive change of the main channel caused
the property which had so accreted to their Morton County
property to be suddenly and abruptly cut off from Morton
County and that, as a result, although such land now is east
of the main channel, it remains a part of Morton County. The
fact that most of the accretion was cut off by the new channel
in 1938 by avulsive action would not change the county of its
location or ownership.
P.724
The evidence at trial fails to support the Findings of Fact
adopted by the lower court, and, eren if they are supported in part,
they are insufficient factually and legally to justify the Conclusions
of taw (which are similarly flawed) for the reason that the evidence
conclusively established that the subject property was located south
of the Weber River in 1866. Absent a necessary contrary finding, the
Judgment must fail for lack of both factual and legal support.
o^

II.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THAT
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS LOCATED NORTH OF THE WEBER RIVER (i.e.,
SO AS TO PLACE IT IN WEBER COUNTY) AS OF JANUARY 10, 1866.
The Complaint in this action pleaded the Davis County tax
deed as the basis for plaintiffs1 claim that the title to the
subject property should be quieted in them. Thereupon, UDOT filed
its Answer setting forth the affirmative defense

(among others)

that the subject property was located in Weber County and that
therefore the Davis County tax sale was illegal and void.
At the Pretrial hearing before Judge Roth on August 4, 1986,
plaintiffs Baxter raised the issue of the burden of proof at trial:
THE COURT: I will let you know who the burden falls on.
MR. WARD: It won't make that much difference. All it means
who has to really proceed first, doesn't it?
THE COURT:...It is the burden of the party contending, you
know, to establish those facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
So I will go through your pleadings and decide where I think the
burden should be.
(Exh. P-20 at p.45)
On August 6, 1986, Judge Roth issued his Memorandum Decision
placing the burden of proof on UDOT:
Page 2
Memorandum Decision
Case No. 74206
Defendant, Utah Department of Transportation alleges, fl affirmatively11, that the tax sale was invalid because the property
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was located in Weber County and that Davis County had no authority
to either tax or sell the property. The general rule is that the
burden of proof or persuasion as to a fact or issue rests on the
party asserting or pleading it. 31A. C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 104,
29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, Sec. 27.
Therefore, in this case, the burden of proving the location of the
property in question lies with the defendant, Utah Department of
Transportation.
Dated this 6 day of August, 1986.
s/d

David E. Roth
David E. Roth, Judge
( R. 490)

The previously referenced case of Tavis v. Higgins adopts
the same rule:
"... Where a defendant in an action to quiet title claims to
be the owner of the property and seeks to have title quieted
in him, he has the burden of proving the allegations of his
claim and, in effect, becomes a party plaintiff.11
The same rule is set forth in 12 Am. Jur.2d, Boundaries, Sec.
99, where it is stated that-11

The burden of proof upon an issue as to a boundary is
upon the party having the affirmative of that issue. This
burden must generally be established by a preponderance
of the evidence."
Assuming, without admitting, that an exact description of the
location of the Weber River in 1866 cannot be determined at this
time and that such fact might conceivably defeat one's right to
prevail in the litigation under different facts and circumstances,
it is obvious that UD0Tfs evidence presented at trial and its theory
as to the nature of the proof to be presented have combined to
completely destroy its case since it failed to prove
-28-

that the subject property was located in Weber County in 1866.
Nor can it extricate itself from its own trap by attempting to
shift its burden to plaintiffs as it attempted to do by sidestepping the issue in the Conclusions of Law (% 518):
"3. The plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Weber changed its course by sudden
avulsive action, so as to leave the property north of
the river in Davis County.ff
( Underlining added)
As a matter of fact, however, all of the evidence conclusively established that the Weber River was north of the subject
property in 1866. To have completely changed its course and to
shift all of its waters to the south side of the subject property
sometime between the last U.S. Survey in 1886 and the first county
survey conducted in 1894, whether caused by natural forces or manmade obstructions, constitutes an avulsive change both as a matter
of fact and law. The river, which formerly exited Section 25,
suddenly exited the Section at a point only 715 feet from the SW
corner-- a deviation of 1,562 feet-- and, in the process, moved from
the north to the south side of the subject property-- a rectangular parcel of land 826.78 feet long and measuring between 412.88
feet and approximately 411.29 feet in a north-south direction at
its respective western and eastern extremities! (See Complaint)
UDOT has not carried its burden of proving that the subject
property was located in Weber County in 1866 pursuant to Judge
Rothfs Pretrial Memorandum Decision. Actually, the Conclusion of
-29-

of Law heretofore set forth, which was prepared by UDOT and adopted
by the lower Court, in practical effect admits the location of the
subject property as being in Davis County

(i.e., south of the

Weber River) in 1866, but UDOT seeks to extricate itself by shifting
to plaintiffs some undefinable standard

of burden of proof. But

the facts speak for themselves: The distances involved in the
channel change are avulsive actions, not changes due to accretion
or reliction.
11 C.J.S.,Boundaries, Section 34-- Shifting of Channel or Shore
... the general rule is that where, by a sudden or violent
change, the channel or shore on which riparian or littoral
lands are bounded is shifted, the boundaries of such lands
are unaffected, and remain in their original position;...t!
72 Am. Jur. 2d^ States, Etc., Sec. 27. Changes in channel as
affecting boundary.
The effect upon boundaries of a state, where such boundaries are fixed by the middle of the main channel of a
river, by the changes in that channel through processes
of accretion and avulsion, is dependent upon the gradualness or suddenness of the change; when the course of the
river and its channel changes gradually, the boundary
follows the channel, but if the river suddenly changes its
course or deserts its natural channel, the boundary remains
where it was before, that is, in the middle of the altered
or deserted riverbed.
And the fact that the former
channel may have ceased to be navigable does not change the
rule. In fixing the boundary along a main navigable channel
which has been left dry by avulsion, all that is required is
such certainty as is reasonable as a practical matter, having
regard to the circumstances.11
78 Am. Jur. 2dyWaters, Sec. 411.Generally.
"... But where the change takes place suddenly and perceptibly either by reliction or avulsion, as where a stream from
any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such
change works no change of boundary or ownership. Title to
land is not lost even temporarily by avulsion.
-30-

In most jurisdictions, the character of the stream or body
of water as tidal, nontidal, navigable or nonnavigable is
immaterial as respects the application of the foregoing
rules relating to accretion, reliction, erosion, and
avulsion. As elsewhere observed, however, in some civil-law
jurisdictions the application of such rules is limited to
streams.11
See also: Quote from 20 C.J.S., Counties, Sec.15, taken
from Tavis v. Higgins, supra.

III.
THE 1894 SURVEY OF THE WEBER RIVER, AS THEN LOCATED DUE TO
AVULSIVE CHANGE, DID NOT AND COULD NOT ESTABLISH A BOUNDARY LINE
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTIES DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED
BY THE TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE ON JANUARY 10, 1866.
None of the U.S. Surveys running north along the west line
of Section 25 revealed either an abandoned
until 22.60 chains

(or live) river channel

(1,49106 feet)-- a minor channel only 26.4 feet

wide, and dry in 1871 and 1886-- or the main channel of the Weber
River, as shown on all three surveys, at 34.5 chains (2,277 feet).
There have been no surveys conducted by the U.S. Surveyor General
since June 28, 1886.
The surveyors of the two counties conducted a survey of the
boundary line as they perceived it to be, in 1894. The survey was
conducted in two parts: first, starting at a point on the Weber
River north of Kingstons Fort (located approximately three miles
westerly of the subject property) and running west to the shore
-31-

of

the Great Salt Lake-- the boundary being monumented at intervals-- and, second, a reverse survey running easterly up the
Weber River and terminating in Weber Canyon—consisting only of
bearing-and-distance courses of the

f,

Meanderings of (the) Weber

River.11 The second portion of the survey was not monumented at any
point (See Exh. D-2).
The 1894 survey, for the first time, found the Weber River flowing across the west line of Section 25 at a point only 715 feet
north of the SW corner of Section 25. Further, the survey courses
placed the Weber River on the south side of the subject property in
1894.
Earl H. Kendell, a life-long resident of the area, testified
that for many years he and his brother and father operated a highway gas station and store, known as Kendellfs Service, at what became the junction of Highway 30 and 89 when Highway 89 was extended
across the general area from south-to-north along the general
direction of the west line of Section 25 sometime in the early 1940s
(Tr. 115-119--R. 668-672).

He pointed out that the old channel of

the Weber River forked and ran on both sides of their store and that
the abandoned river channel was visible on the south side of their
store, and elsewhere

nearby

(Tr. 133--R.686).

He further testified that from the time he was a young boy there
was a large diversion dike which had been constructed across
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the Weber River just below the mouth of Weber Canyon (Tr. 121—R. 674).
The dike began on a bend of the river at the foot of the hillside
below the railroad tracks, and it extended southwesterly for about
1,000 feet, diverting the river in a

southwesterly direction (Tr.

121-123--R.674-676). A headgate was placed in the dike so as to
divert irrigation water from the river and into the old river channel,
where it flowed until taken out downstream to irrigate farm lands in
Uintah (Tr. 123-124--R. 676-677).
Mr. Kendell stated that his grandfather, who was born in 1866,
told him that he helped to build the rock-wall dike at a time when he
was a ngood-sized boy, or older--" a logical time frame which would
fit between 1886-1984 (Tr. 124-128--R.677-681).
The existing rock dike was sketched on the detail of Utah Highway Department road-construction plans in the year 1927 (Exhs. P-18
and D-25), and a pre-1927 road leading up-river into Weber Canyon
hugged the hillside at the northeasterly end of the dike. The diversion dike at the point where the irrigation ditch diversion headgate
was installed was located approximately 1,500 feet North and 2,000
feet East of the SW corner of Section 25-- precisely in line with
the river channel as surveyed in 1894 and as it and the southwesterly
remnant of the rock dike exists today (Cf. Exh. D-4).
It is interesting to note that the 1927 construction plans for
the new highway, which ran northwesterly alongside the old river
channel, provided for a protective barrier at Station 342 (approxi-33-

mately 1,200 feet northeasterly of the rock dike) where evidence
of the old channel had shifted to the south:
lf

STA.342 PROVIDE DYKE ACROSS OLD CHANNEL 300 C.Y.
UNCLASSIFIED BORROW11

Mr. Kendell testified that the Weber River breached the dike
during the flood of 1952, coursed down its old channel and ran on
both sides of the Kendell store (Tr. 128-132--R.681-685; and Exhs.
P-13 and P-14).
Although the channel change tohich occurred between 1886 and
1234 appears to have been associated with irrigation activities and/
or construction and maintenance of the pre-1927 highway which ran
fro*n Ogdcn up to the mouth of Weber Canyon, it was unnecessary to
pinpoint the exact reason for the channel change. Whether due to
natural causes or man-made actiohs, an avulsive change did in fact
occur, but the original boundary line between the two counties did
not change.
It appears obvious that the surveyors who made the 1894 survey
intended and did nothing more than to run a survey of the river
where it was then located. They made no attempt to survey the boundary line between the two counties in the area of the subject property
as it was established by the legislature; in fact, there is nothing
in the survey notes or otherwise suggesting that they were attempting
to resolve any uncertainty or dispute involving the common boundary
or that they were instructed to locate a disputed or uncertain
boundary.
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The 1894 survey was pursued primarily by Davis County to
assist mapmaker E.A. Vail in preparing a county-wide map

lf

of

Davis County, showing School District and Precinct lines,...
(being) in Atlas or book form... to show the Roads of the County,
... all lublic Streams,...ff

(Exh. D--3, excerpted from pp.449

and 451). It would appear that no prior survey of the common
boundary line had been attempted by the two counties and that the
Weber County surveyor

participated in the joint effort to per-

manently locate the boundary, but there is absolutely no evidence
that either county participated in the survey for the purpose of
resolving a then-existing boundary-line dispute or uncertainty'and none can be found. It is conceivable that a few minor problems
may have arisen by 1894 whereby the boundary-line location would
have been a factor, but the rocky and gravelly land which comprised
almost all of the SW% of Section 25 must have been deemed almost
economically worthless at that time.
For whatever value the 1894 survey may have served, the plain
fact remains that neither county ratified or accepted the survey
in the area of the subject property as establishing the boundary
line. In 1904, some 10 years later, the Weber County Commissioners
met with representatives of Davis County and other counties in an
attempt to resolve boundary problems, but the effort ended on a
sour note

(Exh. P-19). Davis County, for its parr, refused to
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accept the survey inasmuch as it continued to tax those lands
located south of the Weber River as it existed in 1866-- as this
litigation aptly demonstrates (Ref. Exh. P-7).
Sec. 86.2 Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, effective as of Feb.20,
1978, provided a procedure whereby boundary disputes between counties
could be determined by the respective surveyors where an uncertainty
or dispute might exist (See Addendum VIII). However, the statute
narrowly limited their authority in the following language:
Nothing in this act shall be construed to give the
surveyors, mentioned herein, any further authority
than to erect suitable monuments to designate said
boundaries as they are now established by law.
( Underlining added)
The statute was defective on its face for the reason that it
imposed upon the surveyors the necessity of making legal decisions
in instances such as illustrated in this case. The constitutional
invnsion of the doctrine of separation of powers and the built-in
risks of violating vested property rights under the Fifth Amendment

and intruding upon constitutional guarantees of procedural due
process is clearly evident. Even if a boundary dispute or uncertainty can be approached factually, as it is submitted the boundary
determination in this matter could have been had the surveyors
been assigned to locate the 1866 boundary line, the Utah cases of
Barton v. Sanpete County and Summit County v. Rich County make it
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abundantly clear that their duty would have been circumscribed by
locating the main channel of the Weber River as it existed in
1866. Neither the legislature nor the surveyors can deviate
from that mandate.
It is also significant to note that in making the 1894 survey
the surveyors erected numerous monuments proceeding west from Kingstons Fort, but in their survey going east and up the Weber River
they did not erect a single monument. In his Memorandum Decision
Judse Hyde felt that the river itself was a monument, but the
statute provided that the surveyors should

lf

erect monuments^ ."

( Underlining added)
The 1878 statute was a make-shift law, and it is therefore
understandable that the three Utah boundary-line line cases heretofore cited all chose to completely disregard surveys which were
made in each instance purportedly pursuant to the

statutory pro-

cedure. In recognition of its limitations, and as being indicative
of the present misguided opinions of the law held by the respective
county surveyors in this case, they filed Affidavits in support of
UDOTfs Motion for Summary Judgment

&. 294, 298 and 302) wherein

each stated that the boundary between the two counties

"since at

least 1894" was the location of the Weber River as established by
the 1894 survey.
It should appear obvious that the legal conclusions in the
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two carbon-copy Affidavits, as well as their wording and preparation, were nothing more than the work of counsel for UDOT who,
at that stage of the proceedings, was contending that the location
of the Weber River at the time of statehood in 1896 should determine

the boundary between the two counties (R- 309).
Judge Roth denied UDOT'S Motion for Summary Judgment based on

the 1894 survey and its contention that it conformed to the statutory procedure for resolving existing disputes or uncertainties in
county boundaries

(Addendum I). His ruling directed that the loca-

tion of the Weber River in 1866 should control. Although the Ruling
indicated that plaintiffs should prove the facts as to the location
cf the river in 1866, his subsequent Memorandum Decision placed the
burden of proof on UDOT.
The 1894 survey was not made pursuant to the 1878 statute
providing for the resolution of disputed or uncertain county boundaries. The survey did nothing to resolve the basic issues in this
case except to prove that an avulsive channel change in the location
of the Weber River occurred sometime between 1886 and 1894. As a
factual matter, the 1894 survey and the Vail map

(Exh. D - 6 ) were

most likely the causative factors which were brought into focus and
helped to create subsequent boundary-line disputes and uncertainties.
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IV.
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED PRECLUDES RESPONDENT FROM
DENYING THE DAVIS COUNTY SOURCE OF TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The Conclusions of Law and the Judgment entered in this
action both recite that UDOT

"is decreed to be the recorded

owner of the subject property.11

And, since UDOT!s title must

derive from the Warranty Deed which it received from Robert Dansie
in 1964,

(Exh. D - 2 3 ) , a closer inspection of that document and

the facts and events relating to it are in order.
The 1964 deed, which was prepared by UDOT's predecessor,
State Road Commission of Utah, contains two specific recitations
which appear for the first time in any title examination:

(a) that

the lands described therein were located in Weber County, rather
than in Davis County, and (b) that Dansie was the owner of the
entire 24.41 acres contained in the legal description. The record
and the evidence fail to support either claim.
In addition to the prior arguments set forth in this Brief,
it should be noted that UDOT took the May 14, 1964 deed to the Davis
County Recorder to be recorded, which was done on June 17, 1964. However, Davis County refused to enter on its records that portion of the
legal description which was shown as being in

ff

Weber County,lf and

only changed the ownership on its plat maps and records to the small
portion of the description-- only 0.87 acre-- set forth in the deed

-39-

ac being in Davis County

(Exh. D -23).

The Davis County

Recorder was simply complying with long-established procedures and
ownership records in her possession. The deed was thereupon taken
to Weber County to be recorded, but once again it was rejected until
1970, when it was finally recorded (R- 318).
It is highly unlikely that the Weber County Recorder

"held"

the deed for a period of six years; rather it seems more likely
that it was returned to UDOT or its predecessor. At any rate, since the
the format of the deed appears to be flawless, the only logical
conclusion which can be accepted for denying recordation are that
one or all of the following defects were present: the described
lands were not shown on the records and maps as being in Weber
County; or the legal description of the lands did not conform to
prior descriptions in the chain cf title, such as might have existed in Weber County; or that the Weber County maps and records did
not show Dansie to be the owner of the described lands. It should
be obvious at this point that all three defects existed.
We do not know what prompted Weber County to ultimately accept
for recording the deed which it

!f

heldff for six years. In any event,

after a lapse of another five years-- during which interval UDOT
was aware that there were other claimants to the property-- UDOT's
counsel in this case once again took the deed to the Davis County
Recorder to have it recorded. However, in order to have it accepted,
-40-

counsel erased "Weber County11 on the two-part description and
substituted "Davis County" in its place, thereby reciting that
all of the described lands were in Davis County. The deed was
recorded in Davis County for the second time on March 31, 1975
(Exh. P-12 and Addendum IX).
An examination of the record in this case reveals a conspicuous absence of exhibits or other believable evidence indicating
a. Weber County source of title to the subject property. Davis
County kept old plat maps (Exh. P-7) and there is a Davis County
chain of title, but documents of any kind which even remotely tie the
subject property to Weber County are either non-existent or, at
best, very vague. The lack of Weber County documentary support and
the refusal to record UDOT's deed from Dansie would raise red flags
in front of any astute title examiner.
When Judge Gould ordered that Weber County and Davis County
be made parties to the lawsuit, Baxters moved for the addition of
Monroe, Inc. as an additional party as the successor-in-interest to
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Co. (R. 162-169). An examination of
Exh. P-7 reveals that Utah Sand & Gravel Products Co, owned the land
in the Si; of the SW^; of Section 25 immediately adjacent to, and soiith
of, the 18-acre tract sold at tax sale to plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter
and his two co-purchasers. Judge Gould denied the motion to include
that property owner in the litigation.
-41-

The Affidavit of Stephen M. Smith, manager of the real
property department of Monroe, stated that approximately eight (8)
acres of Utah Sand & Gravel lands lie north of the center-line of
the channel of the Weber River as it now exists, that its deed to
that land extended back to 1945 and that it was recorded with the
County'Recorder of Davis County, that real property taxes were paid
each year since 1945 to Davis County on its lands (including the
eight acres located north of the river), that UDOT"s deed from
Dansie conflicted with Monroe's ownership of the land located north
of the Weber River, that Weber County never taxed the eight acres
located north of the river, and that UDOT has illegally trespassed
O R said u-ands and, based upon information and belief, claims title
to them

(R.258-259).

In short, the 1964 deed prepared by the State Road Commission
of Utah, and signed by Dansie, contained a 24.41-acre blunder which
UDOT is now attempting to circumvent by every imaginable defense.
That deed included the 18 acres sold by Tax Deed to Baxters and
their predecessors, as well as 6,41 acres, more or less, belonging
to Monroe, Inc.-- all located in Davis County notwithstanding the
avulsive channel change which occurred between 1886 and 1894.
The record in this litigation is devoid of any indication
that a Weber County chain of title exists for the subject property.
On the other hand, there is a Davis County chain of title. On
page 43 of this brief there appears a chronological listing of
-42-

CNAIN-OE-TITLE ANALYSIS
1936 Weber County Tax Deed
(R. U 0 2 — Complaint)

1938 Davis County Quit Claim Tax Deed
( R. U02—: Complaint) and R. UOii

TASMA P. DANSIE
I Tasma P. Dansie v.
|Hachmeister, et al.
( R. U01--Complaint)|
[Quiet Title Action
-—
I
I
I
DECREE QUIETING TITLE
(R. U0£ >, dated 3/26/46
--subject land described as being in Davis County.
I
i

Tasmn P. Dansie
( Warranty Deed 3/10/61; rec. 4/22/64
in Davis County) (R. I4.O9)
(
I
ROBERT REES DANSIE
/
\

-JO-

( and wife)

-via-

tntr P^r.d Con yn of fjtnh
dated 5/14/64; rec.. 3/31/75
in Davis County-- Warranty Deed
Note: Subject land included
in desc. as being located in
Davis County (K)ch. P-12)

DAVIS COUNTY
Tax Sale: Non-payment of
1964 real property taxes

DAVIS COUNTY TAX DEED
—dated 5/26/69
J
(Exh.f^) Recorded 5/26/69
t

Ronald A. Toone (1/3), RONALD BAXTER (1/3), Thomas Hollbere ( 1/3)
( and wife)
( 18 acres total)
( and wife)
-to1
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.
Q. «C. Deed 9/74/69

j

( Exh. P-3)

-toQ.VC. Deed 9/29/70

Deed (9/25/7i>

^ ( E x h . P-5)
( SubjectMand)
6 acres N x
RONALD A.

( Exh. P-U)

(Subject land } , '
6 acres
'
and SHIRLEY DIANE BAXTER
( 6 acres)

-U3-

Ht)

those documents material to this litigation, covering the time
frame since 1938. Every document in the chain of title which
includes the subject property recites that the land is located in
Ifevis

County, except for the maverick deed from Dansie to State

Road Commission of Utah, dated May 14, 1964 and reciting that the
property was located in Weber County-- until UDOT's counsel subsequently altered it in 1975 to show its location to be in Davis
County.
In addition to fortifying Baxter's claim that the subject
property is physically located in Davis County, the documents in
the chain of title establish an alternative and independent legal
basis which supports their position under the doctrine of estoppel
by deed.
Estoppel by deed applies to conveyances in the chain of title
to real property in different circumstances and conditions, but, as
applied to the facts of this case wherein the critical deviation in
the documentary sequence involves a change in the recitals relating
to county location, the law is clear-cut and to the point: Where two
litigants claim title to the same property through a common-source
grantor in the chain of title, both are bound by estoppel from
denying material recitals in any conveyance issuing from the commonsource owner-grantor.
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From Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver:
4. Generally; definition and nature.
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party
to a deed and his privies from asserting as against
the other party and his privies any right or title
in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth
of any material facts asserted in it, Estoppel by deed
is technical in nature, and such an estoppel may conclude a party without any reference to the moral
qualities of his conduct.

Estoppel by deed is a very important aspect of the law
of estoppel. By reason of the operation of this doctrine,
particularly upon grantors of real property and upon
the passage of after-acquired title of such grantors,
the effect of the doctrine upon grantees, and the
effect and extent of control of recitals in conveyances
as an estoppel upon parties thereto and their privies, many
important and practical questions affecting the title to
real property are controlled to a large extent. A person
who is examining the record title to realty should be
able to rely on the doctrine of estoppel by deed,...

8.

Operation and effect, generally.

Estoppels which run with the land and work thereon are
not mere conclusions; they pass estates and constitute
titles, and are muniments of title, assuring it to the
purchaser. The estoppel which inures in favor of a
grantee of land operates in favor of a purchaser from
him; where a grantor is estopped by his deed to set up
title against his grantee, he is likewise estopped to
set it up against the assigns of such grantee. All
persons claiming through the parties estopped are equally
bound by the estoppel. An estoppel which works on an
interest in land runs with the land into whosoever hands
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the land comes, and privies who are bound by such estoppel
include privies in blood and estate. However, an estoppel
by deed is operative only between parties to the deed
and their privies; strangers to the deed are not bound by
nor can they invoke, the estoppel.

C. ESTOPPEL OF GRANTEE AND PRIVIES
13.

Generally.

•..A person cannot claim under an instrument without
confirming it. He must found his claim on the whole, and
cannot adopt that feature or operation which makes in his
favor, and at the same time repudiate or contradict another
which is counter or adverse to it. A grantor has been held
to be estopped to enforce any claim inconsistent with the
valid provisions of a deed.
Footnote: A party cannot be permitted to claim both under
and against the same deed, to insist on its
efficacy to confer a benefit and repudiate a
burden with which it has qualified it, or to
affirm a part and reject a part. Gibson v.
Lyon, 115 U.S.439, 29L.ed 440, 6 S. Ct. 129
In other words he cannot assert that the title obtained
from the grantor or through him is sufficient for his
protection and not available to his contestant. It has
been held that where one entered into the possession of land
under and by virtue of a conveyance in fee, with covenants
of warranty from another, and retaining that possession,
relying upon the grant or possession under it, in aid of
his title or possession, he cannot deny the title thus
acquired against the grantor and those claiming under him...

15. Claimants under common source of title.
It is the general rule that where two parties claim under
the same grantor, each is estopped to deny that the grantor
had title or a right to convey. The principle has been
stated more fully by the Supreme Court of the United States,
-46-

which has declared that where both parties assert title
from a common grantor and no other source, neither can
deny that such grantor had a valid title when he executed
his conveyance. Moreover, it has been held that where each
party claims under a common source, each is estopped to
attack the title antedating the common source.

It is now the generally accepted rule that when two
persons derive title from a common source, one of them
is not estopped to assert against the other a paramount
title which he has subsequently acquired. He may even
admit a common source, and then show that the title
presently relied on is a paramount tax title,...

21. Operation and effect of recitals.
As a broad general rule, subject to the qualifications
herein discussed, all parties to a deed and those claiming
under them are bound by the recital of material facts
in the deed. A recital of one deed in another or of a
fact in a deed binds the parties and those who claim
under them. It is an estoppel which binds parties and
privities-- that is, privies in blood, privies in estate,
and privies in law...
Estoppel by deed precludes UDOT from denying that the subject
property is located in Davis County.
CONCLUSION
The Judgment should be reversed and title to the subject
property should be quieted in plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,

GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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ADDENDUM

I

Judge Roth's Ruling Denying: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Based upon 18?U Survey of Weber River made by County Surveyors.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD L. BAXTER and
SHIRLEY DIANE BAXTER,

]

Plaintiff?

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

)

RIO VISTA OIL, LTD.,
a Utah corporation,
Involuntary Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,

i

Case No. 74206

vs.
ROBERT REES DANSIE, MARIE GROW
DANSIE, DAVIS COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, DAVIS COUNTY
ASSESSOR, DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER,
and WEBER COUNTY, a Body Politic
of the State of Utah,
Third-Party Defendants.

Having

heard

the

arguments

reviewed the memoranda on f i l e r

of

counsel

I r u l e as follows:

I-a

and

having

Page 2
Puling on Motion for
Summary Judgment
Case No. 74206

The boundary

between

Weber

and

Davis

Counties

was

established by description in an Act of the legislature of the
Utah Territory in 1866*

Said description used the main channel

of the Weber River as the boundary in the area of the subject
property.

Plaintiff contends that in 1866, the Weber River was

north of the subject property and that the subject property was
therefore located

in Davis County.

Plaintiff further contends

that the river later altered its course by a sudden, avulsive
action caused by either man-made or natural conditions so as to
place the subject lands on the north side of the Weber River.
Plaintiff argues that the law provides that where there
sudden,

violent

change

in

the

channel

of

a

river

that

is a
the

boundary remains unaffected and remains in the original position
therefor, the subject property remains in Davis County.
This issue has not been litigated in an action including
the parties that are presently before the Court and plaintiff
will be allowed
alleqed

in

summary

judgment

an opportunity

support

of

their

is denied.

to prove
claim.

the

facts

Defendants

they have
motion

for

Plaintiff is to prepare an order

consistent with this decision.
DATED this ^ / day of May, 1986.

Pages 38-1*3 from Pretrial

ADDENDUM II

Hearing before Judge Roth

strongly than what the Court did, your Honor,

The Court said

the boundary was established by description and Mr. Fuller
goes on to say was not only established, but was determined to
be the main channel of the Weber River in the area of the
subject

property.

He has gone just that much farther.

And secondly, your Honor, he has gone on to further
state what the Court then went on to say, the Plaintiffs
contentions after that first paragraph.

The Court went on and

said Plaintiff contends, plaintiff argues, and further—
THE COURT:

You quarrel with number two as being a

correct statement of law?
MR. WARD:

Well, I don't know it is that easy because

there was no main channel of the Weber River. And I think to
include that now might prejudice us later on to the effect that
the Court has concluded there was a main channel of the Weber
River. And we..,SAY%.tbeJ^J«&~not.
HjE_cpjyRT^_ 9k.a.y.f...£HPEose l*e a.sk t,he

T

Jur

Y number one,

in 1866, can it be determined there ^was ^a main^ channel. of ,the_
Weber River at the place in question, yes or no. If_y.ou_^asw„e_rd
yes, was that main channel north or southf_answer north or_soutIj
Number three, wajs^there^vid^
south?

Those three issues for the Jury.

your surveyors, diagrams, maps.

You call your experts,

You do the same thing, let theirj

decide it.
„ MR,.. WARD:E n In essence f yes.

Il-a
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. FULLER:

You agree with that?

I agree.

THE COURT:_ And as to who.has ^ot^the_bu£^n^ I will
look at your pleadings and make a determination.
some things you can stipulate.

I don't know if you are going

to be in the mood to at the time for trial.
tax sale and tax deed.
8

9
10

13

Davis.

You say because you have got the tax deed, the burden

shifts?
MR. FULLER:

Because they^rajLsed^it^by ^f^ir^^i^ye

THE COURT:

Alright, I will look at the pleadings.

defense.

I f vc J.__aJL 1 eged in your Complaint that you intend to prove the

15

property was in Davis County^--

16

MR. FULLER:

17

THE COURT:

19
120

J 21

J

The question is still going to Joe who

14

18

il

Now there is a

|has the burden of proving whether the property is in Weber or

U
12

Not j u s t -

22

423

r

We did not allege that in the pleading.
I will look at that and make a decision

on that. Anything else?
MR. WARD:

Well, that's the ruling of the Court,jpn_

the Order pre.par.ecL by..Mr.....FuJLler?
THE COURT:
the re u n s I g n e d.

I don't t h i ^

I w i 11 1e a ve _ i t unsigned.>

t

I have decided what

the trial will be about.
JAR. W A R D :

X9,^...J£i?-1..A§£X?~JJLJftM

THE CQURT; .J.^fta.ve,,,it..l.D>^uiaigjiiaa4

Il-b
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decision is the 0Drder,
MR. WARD:

That's fine.

MR. HESS:

Would it be appropriate to maybe get a

transcript of what you just identified and make that—incorporate
that into the Pre-trial Order?

Is there going to be an Order

coming forth now?
THE COURT:

A transcript of the three issues that I

felt would be submitted to the Jury?
MR. WARD:

Sure.

Who made the request for Jury trial in this

case?
THE COURT:
MR. FULLER:
MR. WARD:
THE COURT:
MR. WARD:

MR. F U L L E R :
THE C O U R T :

You did.
I think both sides probably did.
Is it too late ,to withdraw _our„rgayest?
Not if you haven't paid for it.
We don't pay anyway.
I t h i n k M r . B a x t e r Jbrought_up>_a j u r o r fee
Y o u h a v e jmade ,a regu^st^a.nd^pAl^.a^fe,e?

. M R .^FULLER:
_
.Yes.

MR. W A R D :
your Honor.

W e w i t h d r a w the r e q u e s t a t t h i s t i m e ,

:rf M r . F u l l e r w a n t s to p a y the f e e , 1 g u e s s h e is

e n t i t l e d t o a jury t r i a l . _But_wg, w i t h d r a w o u r r e q u e s t a t this
time.

MR. F U L L E R :
THE C O U R T :
jury w o n ' t be h e r e .

I am sure i t h a s b e e n p a i d .
You better check.

If i t h a s n ' t , t h e

W h e n is the trial?

II-c
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MR. WARD:

August 20—where is my book.

MR. HESS:

25th.

MR. FULLER:

I think that's right.

9:30 a.m., that's

in the proposed Order.
THE COU:^.

The 25th?

MR. FULLER:

The 25th.

THE COURT:

That's a Monday, that's my law and motion

day.
MR. WARD:

No, it is not the 25th, the 26th and 27th.

MR. FULLER:
MR. WARD:
THE COURT:
MR. WARD:

I think Jerry did give us the 25th.
I have the 26th and 27th.
That's more likely.
Tuesday the 26th.

Here is a notice of tria

setting signed by Jerry Jensen.
MR. FULLER:
THE COURT:
MR. HESS:

Tuesday the 26th.
Anything else?

Alright—

Well, is there going to be a' pre-trial

Order, you know, as far as the date and time and the issues?
1 guess I am just interested to get down that Davis^ County
will not b e _ h ^
MR. WARD:
THE COURT:

That's correct.
We haven't even gotten to witnesses or

c::changing names of witnesses.
MR. WARD:

Mr. Fuller has already indicated who his

witnesses are, and I think I have indicated, not formally, but

Il-d
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Q.

informally.

He never asked, but I have told him who my witnessed

are .
THE COURT:
MR. FULLER:
THE COURT:
MR. FULLER:
MR. WARD:

How many will you have.

Mr. Fuller?

I think we will have four.
Four witnesses?
I think.
He has listed Ron Baxter, Jay Anderson,

Geraldine Page and Earl Kendell.
THE COURT:
MR. WARD:

And how many will you have?
I haven't added them up. The Weber County

Surveyor, the Davis County Surveyor, the Davis County Assessor.
The Davis County Recorder, the Davis County Cier, and Jack De
Moss, Nick Butcovich and maybe Joe Varoz.
THE COURT:
MR. WARD:

Two days going to be enough?
Probably.

I don't know if the Court would

allow a viewing.
THE COURT:
necessary.

I don't know if a pre-trial Order is

Maybe it should be.

It will show that defendants

agreed that they are not proceeding on Mtheir counterclaim_ag_ains
Davis County, that Davis and Weber County will remain as parties
to the action, a^j^^between_t^_tj^^counties, wi^ll^ be.vbpupd
by the decision of the Jury.

But that no other parties are,

bound that are not present.
You want it to show that Davis and Weber Counties will not

Il-e
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Pretty much a gentleman's, agreement at this point, but I am not
sure I can do that and have you bound by the decision.
leave it up to you.

The Court is here, the Jury will be here,

the forum is available.

If you want to jump in and take a side

one way or another, you can do it.
MR. HESS:

I will

If you don't want to--

Well, I think that our people, both Weber

and Davis, are going to be involved as witnesses, so probably
just vith the understanding here that as the Court has outlined
I don't know it needs to be formalized.
THE COURT:

Three questions will be presented to the

Jury, at least it is anticipated that_ three guestions ^will be.
Number 1, is it possible to determine the location of_the_main
channel of the Weber River in 1866 as it applies to the property
in question?
next question.

If the answer to that is yes, then they go to the
If the answer is ,no, the tria1 of oyer.

Question number 2, is that main channel north or south of
the property in question.

If the answer is north, then was therje

a sudden—whatever the language is.
MR. WARD:
THE COURT:

Violent evulsive change.
Whatever.

I just^had in_my_memqra^^

sudden shift in the channel to its present location^ or some
location south of the property in Question.
MR. FULLER:

Would it be appropriate to have an

Instruction for the jury as to the position of the two counties
in the case?

I would think so, that they,r§^ree^to^be bound_by

Il-f
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ADDENDUM III

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RONALD L. BAXTER and
SHIRLEY DIANE BAXTER,

]

Plaintiff,

i

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD.,
a Utah corporation,

]

Involuntary Plaintiff,
vs.

]

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

]

Defendant and
'
Third-Party Plaintiff, i
vs.

Case No. 74206

]

ROBERT REES DANSIE, MARIE GROW
'
DANSIE, DAVIS COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, DAVIS COUNTY
ASSESSOR, DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER, ]
and WEBER COUNTY, a Body Politic ]
of the State ot Utah,
Third-Party Defendants. '

The question presented in this case is:
Weber River in 1866•

Where was the

The boundary between Weber and Davis County

was established by description in an act of the legislature of
Utah Territory in 1866.

The description used the roain cnannel ot
Ill-a
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the Weber

River

as the boundary

in the area of the subject

property.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that in 1866 the

Weber River was north of the subject property, and the property
was,

therefore, located

in

Davis

County.

Plaintiff

further

contends the river later altered its course by sudden avulsive
action caused by either man-made or natural conditions, so that
the subject property lands on the north side of the Weber River.
Plaintiff relies primarily upon three surveys:
1855; one in 1877; and a third in 1886.
west border of Section 25.
river

crossing

One in

These surveys are ot the

The notes of these surveys show the

the west boundary

of the section at different

locations, but primarily north of the subject

property.

The

problem with this is that it does not show where the river was,
say, 50 feet east of the border.
ing, for
Exhibit

example, both

It becomes even further confus-

Plaintiff's

7 are plat maps

and

show

Exhibit 7 and
the

river

Derendant's

somewhat north.

However, when you take Defendant's Exhibit 8, which is Section 26
bordering 25, the locations of the river are far off, and the
plat map in 26 shows the river crossing the border far south ot
what

the

shows.

plat map
Admittedly,

in

Plaintiff's

these

and

plat maps

Defendant's

are

just

Exhibit

7

that, and are

undated, but they do show the confusion in regard to the actual
location ot the Weber River.
Ill-b
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Tne engineers called as witnesses, when asked a direct
question:
would

"Can you tell us where the Weber River was in 1866?"

answer, "No".

No one channel

is shownf

nothing

is

definitive.
It appears that in about 1894 f the surveyor of Davis
County and a deputy surveyor in Weber County surveyed the river.
Their survey shows the river to be, for all intents and purposes,
where it is today.

This survey was done under a statute that

states whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall rise as to any
county

boundaryf

the

same

may

be

determined

surveyors ot the counties interested.

by

the

county

This appears to be wnat

the 1894 survey between the two county surveyors was.

Plaintiff

contends that surveyors can only erect monuments, and that they
cannot designate or agree upon the boundaries.
they did anything other
uncertainty.

than survey

in order

No evidence that
to clarify

the

As for the non-erection of monuments as suchf the

evidence indicates monuments are not generally erected along a
river, because a river is generally a monument.
I hold that the pjep^de£c^j^j^^^
an

e

* a c t location of the river in 1866 cannot be placed.

It

appears that the river, like the proverbial big gorilla, went
wherever it wanted to.

The 1855,

f

71, and

f

86 surveys of the

west section line indicate primarily that the course of the river
was subject to change.

There is no evidence to show that the
III-c
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river changed its course by a sudden, avulsive action, so as to
leave property north of the river in Davis County*

I further

hold that there was definitely an uncertainty as to the location
of

the

river, which

caused

an

uncertainty

as to

the county

boundary, and pursuant to this statute, _thi^ uncertainty^ may be
determined by county surveyors and this was done in 1894, and
that that survey established the boundary between the counties.
That survey was just that, a survey of the location of the river,
and there is certainly no evidence to indicate that the surveyors
made any changes in the river, or did anything other _ than just
survey the river bv metes and bounds.
river

definitely.

The 1894 survey set the

There being no prior surveys of the river

itself, to place the river

in a location other

than the,_1894

survey is_just speculation.
«

*

—

'"

'

" "

"

^

•

-

«

•

—

—

—

.

—

•

-

-

I, therefore, hold that the boundary between Davis and
Weber Counties being the main channel of the Weber River is as
the

1894

survey

place

the

river, which

description

basically

coincides with the present location of the Weber River.
The subject property is and has been in Weber County.
The sale by Davis County was invalid and of no effect whatsoever*

Plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to have the title ot

the real property quieted as against defendants.

Ill-d
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Detendant to prepare findingsf conclusions and judgment
in accordance herewith.
DATED this .5

day of September, 1986.

l
RONSXLD" 0. HYDE, C

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
1986,

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

o
the

day of September,
foregoing

Decision was served upon the following:
Stephen C. Ward
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Utah Department
of Transportation
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiffs
245 North Vine Street #608
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Gerald E. Hess
Assistant Davis County Attorney
Attorney for Davis County
County Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Brent E. Johns
Assistant Weber County Attorney
Attorney for Weber County
7th floorf Municipal Building
Ogden, Utah 84401

Ill-e
PASliA CARR, Secretary

Memorandum

ADDENDUM

DAVID L .

IV

WILKINSON

Attorney General
DONALD S. COLEMAN - Bar No. 0695
Chief, P h y s i c a l Resources D i v i s i o n
STEPHEN C. WARD - Bar No. 3384
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
124 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 533-66 84
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RONALD L. BAXTER and SHIRLEY
DIANE BAXTER, husband and
wife,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs ax3
Appellants,
vs.
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., a
Utah Corporation,

C i v i l N o . 74206

An Involuntary
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant, ThirdParty Plaintiff
and Respondent,
vs.
•ROBERT REES DANS IE a n d MARIE
GROW DANSIE, h i s w i f e ; DAVIS
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS

IV-a

COUNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS
COUNTY RECORDER; and WEBER
COUNTY, a Body Politic of
the State of Utah,
Third-Party
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on the 26th day of August,
1986.

The Plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Glen E. Fuller, the

Defendant Utah Department of Transportation was represented by
Mr. Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, the Defendant
Weber County was represented by Mr. Brent E. Johns, Assistant
Weber County Attorney, and the Davis County Defendants were represented by Mr. Gerald E. Hess, Assistant Davis County Attorney.
Testimony and evidence was adduced by both parties in
regard to the issues formed for hearing and trial, namely the
location of the boundary between Davis and Weber Counties.

The

Court having received and considered testimony from various
witnesses as well as considering the memoranda and oral arguments
and thereupon taken the matter under advisement and being now
fully advised in all and singular the law and facts in the
premises, does now make and adopt its Findings of Fact.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The boundary between Weber and Davis Counties was

established by description in an act of the legislature of the
Utah Territory in 1866.
2.

The description used the main channel of the Weber

River as the boundary in the area of the subject property.
3.

Three surveys were made along the west border of

IBS-^

187/

Section 25 in the years of 1885/ 1877 and 1886.

These three

surveys show the river crossing the west boundary of the section
at

different locations.
4.

These three surveys referred to in the preceeding

paragraphs did not describe the location of the river east of the
section line.
5.

That in 1894 the surveyors of Davis and Weber

Counties surveyed the location of the Weber River.

The survey

described the River for all intents and purposes, where it is
today.
6.

The survey was done under statute that states

wherein amy dispute or jincertainty shajl arise^as to any county
boundary, the same may be determined by the county surveyors of
the interested counties.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The preponderance of evidence shows that an exact
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location of the Weber River in 1866 cannot be determined.
2.

The prior surveys indicates that the Weber River

was subject to change.
3.

The Plaintiff failed to prove by preponderance of

evidence that the Weber changed its course by a sudden avulsive
actionf so as to leave the property north of the river in Davis
County.
4.

That a definite unnertaintv existed as to the

location of the Weber River, which caused an uncertainty as to
the county boundary, and pursuant to statute, this uncertainty
may be determined by county surveyors and was done in 1894, and
that survey established the boundary between the two counties.
5.

The 1894 survey established the boundary between

Weber and Davis Counties as the main channel of the Weber River
and the county boundary has remained the location of the Weber
River up to the present time.
6.

The subject property, the description of which is

as follows:
A portion of the South h of the North h of the
Southwest h of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Beginning at a point which is N. 33°42f W. 1571.1
feet and N. 89°48 W. 275.34 feet from the South h
Corner of Section 25, Township 5, North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence: N. 89°48f W. 826.78 feet along the h Section
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l i n e of s a i d S e c t i o n 2 5 , thence North 412.88 f e e t
t o the e x i s t i n g l highway I-80-N right-of-way l i n e ,
thence S. 8 0 ° 0 3 E. 697.00 f e e t along s a i d highway
right-of-way l i n e t o the West right-of-way l i n e of
Weber Basin
Aqueduct, S t a t i o n 4 5 + 8 3 . 5 1 , thence
S. 43°13 l E. 133.51 f e e t along
s a i d aqueduct r i g h t of-way l i n e , thence S. 46°47 f W. 100.00 f e e t along
s a i d aqueduct right-of-way l i n e , thence S. 43°13' E.
177.78 f e e t along s a i d r i g h t - o f - w a y l i n e t o t h e point
of beginning.
Containing 6.00 a c r e s .
i s and ha.s always been inJWeber county.
7.

The tax s a l e conducted on t h e s u b j e c t property was

i n v a l i d and of no e f f e c t whatsoever.
8.

The P l a i n t i f f

i s , t h e r e f o r e , not e n t i t l e d t o have

the t i t l e t o the property which i s the s u b j e c t matter of

this

l a w s u i t and be q u i e t e d as a g a i n s t t h e s e Defendants.
9.

That the Defendant Utah Department of Transporta-

t i o n i s t h e recorded owner of the subject property.
DATED t h i s

fc>

day of September, 1986.
BY THE COURT:
?/</

c(f>nj4sl<l (y.
RONALD 0 .

HYDE

D i s t r i c t Judge
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ADDENDUM V

DAVID L . WILKINSON

Attorney General
DONALD S . COLEMAN - Bar No. 0695
Chief, P h y s i c a l Resources D i v i s i o n
STEPHEN C. WARD - Bar No. 33 84
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
124 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t L a k e C i t y r U t a h 84114
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 5 3 3 - 6 6 8 4
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RONALD L . BAXTER a n d SHIRLEY
DIANE BAXTER, h u s b a n d a n d
wife,
P l a i n t i f f s and
Appellants,

:
:
:

JUDGMENT

vs.
RIO VISTA O I L , L T D . , a
Utah C o r p o r a t i o n ,
An I n v o l u n t a r y
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 74206

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant, ThirdParty Plaintiff
and Respondent,
vs.
ROBERT REES DANSIE and MARIE
GROW DANSIE, his wife; DAVIS
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS

V-a

CODNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS
COUNTY RECORDER; and WEBER
COUNTY, a Body Politic of
the State of Utah,
Third-Party
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on the 26th day of August,
1986.

The Plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Glen E. Fuller, the

Defendant Utah Department of Transportation was represented by
Mr. Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, the Defendant
Weber County was represented by Mr. Brent E. Johns, Assistant
Weber County Attorney, and the Davis County Defendants were represented by Mr. Gerald E. Hess, Assistant Davis County Attorney.
The Court after making its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereby makes and enters the following Judgment:
1.

That the following described tract of property is

and has always been in Weber County, State of Utah:
A portion of the South h of the North h of the
Southwest h of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Beginning at a point which is N. 33°42f W. 1571.1
feet and N. 89°48f W. 275.34 feet from the South h
Corner of Section 25, Township 5, North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
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thence: N. 89°48f W. 826.78 feet along the h Section
line of said Section 25, thence North 412*88 feet
to the existing highway I-8Q-N right-of-way line,
thence S. 80°03l E. 697.00 feet along said highway
right-of-way line to the West right-of-way line of
Weber Basin
Aqueduct, Station 45+83.51, thence
S. 43°13l E. 133.51 feet along
said aqueduct rightof-way line, thence S. 46°47l W. 100.00 feet along
said aqueduct right-of-way line, thence S. 43°13' E.
177.78 feet along said right-of-way line to the
point of beginning. Containing 6.00 acres.
2.

That the tax sale wherein the Plaintiffs purchased

the subject property from Davis County was involved is of no
effect whatsoever.
3.

The Defendant Utah Department of Transportation is

decreed to be the recorded owner of the subject property.
4.

That the Plaintiffs have no interest whatsoever in

the subject property.
DATED this " ^

j

Qc^^r
day of Scplemfeer, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

RONALD 6. HYDE
District Judge
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ADDENDUM VI
Bccerpts fron Certified Copies of Field Notes of Official
U# S, Surveys of West Line of Section 2$—Exhs. P-15, P-16
and P-17. Surveys made in 1855, 1871 and 1886.

RE POUT:
^Examined
Transcribed
, Compared \
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ADDENDUM

VII

EXHIBIT D-16
1886 Map of portion of Section
2$ prepared by Surveyor General
"strictly conformable"to the
field notes" of the U. S. Survey.

Location of Subject Property
(Superimposed in red)
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UNITED STATED
DEPARtiiENT OF THE WKERIOR
Burtttb of Land Martl^ment
Utah State Office
University Club Buijding
136 E. So. Temple
Salt Uke Gity. Utah 84111

t hereby certify that this

w * * ^

ADDENDUU VIII
BOUNDARY-LINE DISPUTE STATUTE
Sec. 86.2 COMPILED UV;S of Utah
1888, effective as of Feb. 20, 10 fo

Sec. 86,2 Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall arise as
to any county boundary, the same may be determined by the
county surveyors of the counties interested, and in case they
fail to agree, or otherwise fail to establish the boundary,
the county courts of either or both counties interested, may
engage the services of the aforesaid Territorial Commissioner,
who, with the said county surveyors, or either of them, if but
one appear for that purpose, shall proceed forthwith to
permanently determine such boundary line at the expense of the
counties interested by making the necessary surveys and erecting
suitable monuments to designate said boundaries, which shall be
deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enactment.
Nothings in this act shall be construed to give the surveyors,
mentioned herein, any further authority than to erect suitable
monuments to designate said boundaries as they are now established
by law.(l)fl
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Parcel No. 80N-6:l6:H5
6(4)51
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ADDENDUM
H

EXH.
Robert Rees Dansle & Marie Grow Dansie, his wife
• Grantors..,
of Murray9
County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah,
hcret^eonvcy and warranty to the STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF UTAH, Grantee,forthe sum of
Seven M t B a o , Five Hundred and Eighty-four and no/lOOths
Dollars, "
the following described parcel of land in Davis and Weber County, State of Utah, to-wit:
Two parcels of land In fee for a freeway known as Project No* 80N-6, being
part of an entire tract of property, In the SWi of Section 25, T. 5. N. f R. 1 W „
S.L.B.&M. The boundaries of said parcel of land ere described as follows:
C#&> IN DAVIS COUNTY:
Beginning on the west line of said Section 25 at a point 145.7 ft, radially
distant southerly from the center line of said project, which point Is approximately 3^56 ft* southerly from the NW. corner of said Section 25; thence S. 88°
2kl E. 536.17 ft. to a point 120.0 ft. perpendicularly distant southerly from .
said center line at Engineer Station 51+18.27; thence S. 80* 03 1 E . 1481.73 ft.;
thence S. 49* 05* £• 85 ft., more or less, to the center of.the Weber River;
thence Southwesterly 2200 ft., more or less, along the center of said river to
the west line of said Section 25; thence Northerly 980 ft., more or less, to the
point of beginning •% shown on the official map of said project on file In the
office of the State Road Commission of Utah. The above described parcel contains
24.41 acres, more or less.
ALSO IN DAVIS COUNTY:
Beginning on the south line of the NE£ SVf£ of said Section 25 at a point
240.0 ft. perpendicularly distant southerly from the center line of said project,
which point is approximately 300 ft. westerly from the SE. corner of said NE$
SV£; thence N. 8 0 # 03' W . 200 ft., more or less, to a point 240.0 ft. perpendicularly distant southerly from said center line at Engineer Station 68+00; thence
N. 49* 05• W . 150 ft., more or less, to the center of the Weber River; thence
Southwesterly 3$8 ft., more or less, along the center of said river to the south
line of said NE£ SWj; thence Easterly 640 ft., more or less, along said south
line to the point of beginning as shown on the official map of said project on
file in the office of the State Road Commission of Utah. The above described
2 !
parcel of land contains 0.87 acre, more or less.
NOTE: This deed is subject to a U.S.A. pipe line Easement (501-242) Weber
Aqueduct..
Any and all water rights pertaining to the above described land are hereby
reserved by the grantor, and the grantee shall not be liable for any water
assessments now dum or which shall become due.
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WITNESS,""the" bindi^'of said Grantorf_, this

day of

May
Signed in the presence of:

I
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—mm
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flat to Mr aw** YM mtfT,,.

**<->' : « 1
~—m mm
«e tag
14th
M9n0mn
itpftt 8 \$&& ' /
*W&*
* Haf.' ">< •••- .A. D. 1964
\/^Pf*^9£e^\me
Robert RtflT Dansie & Marie Grow Dansie, h i s w i f e

- *

• personally

'"".•
thesVgnefs_of
the within
A instrument,
inttruinent, who duly acknowled]
acknowledged to
My Commission expires:
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